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Abstract
Background: Since 2001, state and local health departments in the United States (US) have accelerated
efforts to prepare for high-impact public health emergencies. One component of these activities has been
the development and conduct of exercise programs to assess capabilities, train staff and build relationships.
This paper summarizes lessons learned from tabletop exercises about public health emergency
preparedness and about the process of developing, conducting, and evaluating them.
Methods: We developed, conducted, and evaluated 31 tabletop exercises in partnership with state and
local health departments throughout the US from 2003 to 2006. Participant self evaluations, after action
reports, and tabletop exercise evaluation forms were used to identify aspects of the exercises themselves,
as well as public health emergency responses that participants found more or less challenging, and to
highlight lessons learned about tabletop exercise design.
Results: Designing the exercises involved substantial collaboration with representatives from participating
health departments to assure that the scenarios were credible, focused attention on local preparedness
needs and priorities, and were logistically feasible to implement. During execution of the exercises, nearly
all health departments struggled with a common set of challenges relating to disease surveillance,
epidemiologic investigations, communications, command and control, and health care surge capacity. In
contrast, performance strengths were more varied across participating sites, reflecting specific attributes
of individual health departments or communities, experience with actual public health emergencies, or the
emphasis of prior preparedness efforts.
Conclusion: The design, conduct, and evaluation of the tabletop exercises described in this report
benefited from collaborative planning that involved stakeholders from participating health departments and
exercise developers and facilitators from outside the participating agencies. While these exercises
identified both strengths and vulnerabilities in emergency preparedness, additional work is needed to
develop reliable metrics to gauge exercise performance, inform follow-up action steps, and to develop re-
evaluation exercise designs that assess the impact of post-exercise interventions.
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Background
Since 2001, state and local health departments in the US
have accelerated efforts to prepare for bioterrorism and
other high-impact public health emergencies. These activ-
ities have been spurred by federal funding and guidance
from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and the Health Resources and Services Administra-
tion (HRSA) [1-3]. Over time, the emphasis of this guid-
ance has expanded from bioterrorism to include
"terrorism and non-terrorism events, including infectious
disease, environmental and occupational related emer-
gencies" [4] as well as pandemic influenza [5].
For any locality, the rarity of major public health emer-
gencies necessitates the use of practice-based exercises to
simulate real life experiences in order to develop and
improve skills and to assess response capabilities over
time. The US Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) describes six levels of exercises, increasing in com-
plexity from informational seminars that minimally exer-
cise response capacities to simulations that mimic reality
and exercise participants' capacity to implement emer-
gency response functions [6].
Intermediate in this progression is the tabletop exercise,
which FEMA describes as a "facilitated group analysis of
an emergency situation." As practiced in public health,
there is considerable variability in how tabletop exercises
are designed and conducted. Tabletop exercises may be
structured discussions of evolving events or unstructured
reactions to short scenarios; participants may be limited
to public health staff or involve representatives from part-
ner agencies or organizations; scenarios may range from
simple to complex; and facilitation may range from being
minimally directive, allowing participants to assume
responsibility for managing the discussion through "role
play," to highly directive, enabling the facilitator to assure
that specific questions are addressed.
Recognizing the need to exercise public health emergency
response, and enabled by funding and directives from
CDC and HRSA, health departments throughout the US
have implemented exercise programs. These exercise pro-
grams have had varying goals, including building rela-
tionships among stakeholders [7,8], training staff [9-11],
and evaluating preparedness levels [12,13], and they have
been used for a variety of purposes, including to identify
gaps in preparedness [14], make recommendations for
improving preparedness [15], and identifying variations
in preparedness across health departments [16]. These
exercises have involved diverse groups of stakeholders
involved in public health preparedness, such as represent-
atives from public health [17], health care [18], agricul-
ture [19], and emergency medical services [20]. Despite
the commonality of preparedness and response compo-
nents across a variety of biological threats, most exercises
have been designed for single use and focus on single dis-
ease, such as smallpox [21], pandemic influenza [22], or
a novel virus [23].
These exercises have focused attention on the interaction
between preparedness goals and exercise strategies, and
have illuminated strengths and vulnerabilities in public
health emergency decision making and response capaci-
ties. The increased utilization of tabletop exercises by
health departments has not been accompanied by a paral-
lel increase in knowledge sharing about lessons learned
from them, either with regard to identifying common
challenges that confront health departments or strategies
for effective exercise design and management. Further, the
literature dealing with tabletop exercises to date consists
almost entirely of case studies and descriptions of a single
exercise or a single disease. This paper describes lessons
learned by public health researchers at RAND, and their
collaborators, about the process of developing and con-
ducting tabletop exercises in collaboration with state and
local health departments in the US and their implications
for public health emergency preparedness.
Methods
Data for this paper come from four related projects con-
ducted from 2003–2006. Taken together, these projects
involved developing, conducting, and evaluating 31 tab-
letop exercises with state and local health departments of
different sizes and structures in 13 different states across
the northeast, south, mid-west, and west regions of the
country (Table 1). Participating health departments did
not incur any expenses through their involvement in these
exercises other than the staff time required to participate.
Two of these projects, one in California and the other in
Georgia, involved the conduct of exercises in multiple
jurisdictions in the same state. In California, the Little
Hoover Commission, a bipartisan, independent state
body, asked RAND to assess California's public health
infrastructure. A key component of the project, described
in greater detail elsewhere [16], was the development of a
tabletop exercise that simulated a smallpox outbreak. This
exercise was conducted in seven local health departments
across California. In Georgia, RAND collaborated with the
Georgia Division of Public Health and the Rollins School
of Public Health at Emory University to develop, conduct,
and evaluate a series of tabletop exercises focusing on dif-
ferent biologic agents in seven local health departments
across Georgia, as well as one exercise focused at the state
level.
The two remaining projects were funded by US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) and involved
the participation of multiple local health departments.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:92 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/92
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The first project involved developing ten different table-
top exercise templates and formats focusing on the local
public health response to bioterrorist agents. These were
tested in 13 local health departments in 12 different
states. The second project involved developing a tabletop
exercise to examine the interface between local health
departments and health care systems in a hypothetical
influenza pandemic. This exercise was tested in three local
health departments in different states. Greater detail on
the structure for these tabletop exercises as well as the tab-
letop exercise templates themselves can be found else-
where [7,17].
All exercises focused on at least one of three related objec-
tives: training, relationship-building, and evaluation. The
structure and design of the tabletop exercises varied from
project to project because their objectives were somewhat
different. The key domains covered are outlined in Table
2. The level of facilitator involvement varied with the exer-
cise objectives. At one extreme, the facilitator's role was
limited to introducing the exercise scenario and periodi-
cally interjecting updates. During these exercises, the par-
ticipants were encouraged to lead the discussion
themselves, based on their respective roles in their agency
or organization. At the other extreme, the facilitator took
a very active role by leading the discussion and interject-
ing questions or prompts. In between were exercises in
which the facilitator turned the discussion over to partici-
pants but occasionally joined the discussion to request
clarifications from the participants or assure that issues
critical to the exercise objectives were discussed.
Despite these differences, all of the exercises shared com-
mon elements, including: evolving hypothetical scenar-
ios, facilitated group discussions, and some level of
collective decision making by participants emphasizing
Table 1: Descriptive Characteristics of Participating Health Departments
Region Size of Population* Agent Tested Length in Hours Facilitator 
Involvement**
Number of 
Participants
Midwest medium novel 8.0 moderate 22
Midwest large pandemic flu 6.0 active 21
Midwest medium smallpox 3.0 moderate 17
Northeast large smallpox 2.0 limited 5
Northeast medium plague 3.0 limited 20
Northeast medium smallpox 3.0 active 8
Northeast medium anthrax 3.5 active 8
Northeast small smallpox 3.0 limited 12
South medium smallpox 5.0 moderate 12
South medium pandemic flu 6.0 moderate 23
South medium pandemic flu 6.0 active 44
South medium smallpox 3.0 moderate 15
South medium smallpox 5.0 limited 14
South medium botulism 6.0 moderate 23
South medium botulism 5.0 moderate 13
South large botulism 2.0 moderate 18
South small pandemic flu 5.0 active 16
South small novel 8.0 moderate 20
South large plague 3.0 limited 13
South small novel 8.0 moderate 11
South small botulism 5.0 limited 26
South large smallpox 8.0 moderate 15
West medium smallpox 4.0 active 15
West medium smallpox 4.0 active 16
West small smallpox 4.0 active 15
West medium smallpox 4.0 active 17
West medium smallpox 4.0 active 15
West large smallpox 4.0 active 11
West large smallpox 4.0 active 23
West medium plague 3.0 limited 11
West large smallpox 4.0 active 14
*< 100,000 = small, 100,000–1,000,000 = medium, > 1,000,000 = large;
**Mild involvement-most of exercises was role played by participants, with very little intervention or direction from facilitators; Moderate 
involvement-most of exercises was role played or issue discussion, with the facilitator inserting additional probes and ensuring the discussion stayed 
on track; Active-most of the exercise was more discussion based, with facilitator asking questions or identifying issues that were subsequently 
discussed.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:92 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/92
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the role of local health departments in recognizing and
initiating a response to an emergency. The scenarios typi-
cally began with a single case report or series of case
reports that heralded a nascent disease outbreak and
required a public health assessment. These situations exer-
cised the internal communication and coordination
across disciplines within health departments as well as the
communication and coordination with partner agencies
and organizations such as health care facilities and emer-
gency medical service agencies. Several exercises extended
beyond this initial response and included scenarios that
progressed days or weeks into an outbreak, requiring
greater interactions between local- and state-level author-
ities and attention to health care surge capacity.
Every exercise concluded with a "hot wash" in which par-
ticipants discussed their collective performance, identified
strengths and weaknesses, and when relevant, related
their performance to experience with actual outbreaks or
crises. In the latter exercises, participants were prompted
to develop an initial 'action plan' that addressed key vul-
nerabilities identified in the exercise. The facilitators sub-
sequently generated a written "After Action Report" (AAR)
that summarized the exercise experience and highlighted
the observed strengths and areas for improvement. In
addition, participants completed exercise evaluation
forms. These consisted of a series of structured and semi-
structured questions that asked participants to discuss
what they learned during the exercise and to evaluate
aspects of the exercise structure and conduct. For example,
participants were asked to identify key gaps in prepared-
ness that occurred during the exercise and to identify the
most useful thing they learned during the tabletop exer-
cise. The observations reported here are based on review-
ing the after action reports, participant evaluations, as
well as internal team discussions and consensus following
the exercise debriefings.
Results
Common themes
The performance of health departments that participated
in our tabletop exercises varied from agency to agency.
However, there were consistent themes that emerged
across the agencies, regardless of the structure or the bio-
logic agent/disease discussed; nearly all agencies struggled
with a common set of challenges. These challenges, sum-
marized in Table 3 and described below, represent critical
dimensions of an outbreak response.
Surveillance and investigation
Many local health departments did not have a structured
process for notifying or soliciting case reports from health
care providers in the community other than those in hos-
pitals, largely because they did not have reliable contact
information for private providers or a sure means to reach
them rapidly. In most instances local health departments
had good relations with staff in local hospitals (e.g., emer-
gency department staff and infection control practition-
ers) but did not appear to have similar working
relationships with non-hospital based practitioners.
Local public health officials were sometimes unsure about
their direct role in following up with suspected ill patients
and collecting and shipping clinical samples for labora-
tory testing. For example, there was frequently confusion
around whether it was the responsibility of the local
health department, the state health department, or the
medical personnel at the hospital to collect laboratory
samples. Once the samples were collected there was often
confusion around whose responsibility it was to transport
the samples, and in a few sites, local law enforcement
Table 3: Common Challenges Observed Across Participating 
Health Departments
Issue Area Observed Challenges
Surveillance and 
investigation
• Notification of non-hospital health care 
providers
• Level and type of staff involvement
• Laboratory sample handling and processing
Communications • Reactive, passive media contacts
• Reaching vulnerable populations
• Communicating with response partners
Command and 
control
• Full implementation of ICS and EOC
• Handoffs between local and state
• Expectations regarding the CDC
Medical surge 
capacity
• Concrete planning
• Accurately counting staff
• Recruiting, training, and mobilizing volunteers
Table 2: Tabletop Exercise Design Variability
Design Element Variability
Exercise length • 2–8 hours
Number of participants • 10–40 participants
Types of participants • Public health (local and state)
• Law enforcement and fire
• Emergency preparedness (local and state)
• Elected officials and policymakers
• Health care providers and administrators
• Emergency medical services (EMS)
Agent/disease exercised • Plague
• Anthrax
• Smallpox
• Botulism
• Hypothetical or Novel
• Pandemic influenza • Avian Influenza
Facilitator involvement • Limited
• Moderate
• ActiveBMC Public Health 2007, 7:92 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/92
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were surprised to find out that they were the responsible
party. A related issue was the ability of health departments
to realistically generate enough surge capacity in their
public health workforce to investigate or respond to a
large event, especially one that encompassed multiple
jurisdictions in the same state, thereby limiting the state
health department's ability to shift manpower and
resources from one jurisdiction to the next.
Communications
Few of the health departments in which we conducted
exercises were proactive in their contacts with the media,
and most waited until they were contacted by the media
to begin communicating with the public. One conse-
quence of this passive approach was that public health
officials often responded defensively to early and some-
times unexpected media requests and in turn, had trouble
quickly formulating an initial message to the public that
was clear, informative, and alleviated anxiety.
Health departments consistently expressed uncertainty
about how to effectively communicate with vulnerable or
underrepresented population groups in their jurisdic-
tions, and few had well established relationships with
community leaders or organizations that could serve as
messengers or communications channels to these groups.
In several sites, law enforcement and EMS personnel
present in exercises had greater familiarity with these
groups and could help identify trusted community mes-
sengers. Further, in some communities, health depart-
ments had limited language capacities or were not
sufficiently familiar with community leaders to commu-
nicate effectively with these groups.
Communicating fully and effectively with response part-
ners (e.g., law enforcement and EMS) about their occupa-
tional health risks and personal protection was also a
challenge for local public health. In particular, while pub-
lic health officials were usually quick to notify response
partners soon after determining an event to be significant,
response partners in many cases felt that public health
officials were slow to provide them with critical informa-
tion about the disease in question, what their risks might
be, or what actions they should take to protect themselves.
As a result, response partners frequently reported feeling
either left out of the process or expressed concerns about
continuing to work unless the risks to them were clarified
and more was done to ensure their safety on the job.
Command and control
The use of the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) and its associated Incident Command Structure
(ICS) structure is relatively new to public health. This was
evident in the exercises, in that nearly all health depart-
ments had difficulties deciding if and when to implement
the ICS process and in identifying the party who would
serve as incident commander. Similar challenges were
seen in the decision and processes related to opening an
Emergency Operations Center (EOC). As a result, in many
exercises, local public health officials delayed taking these
steps and preferred maintaining a more informal manage-
ment process. This approach was preferred even as the
outbreak became progressively larger, thereby stressing
these informal networks.
As outbreaks evolved, there was often a lack of clarity
about whether and when local health departments should
hand off control to the state health department, how
responsibilities should be jointly shared between local
and state authorities, and whether or when federal agen-
cies, such as CDC, should become involved. In many of
the exercises, state health departments were surprised by
the level of assistance requested by their local health
departments especially in the early stages of the outbreak;
in other more rare examples, state health departments sur-
prised local health departments by assuming roles and
responsibilities local health departments regarded as their
own. Regardless, the general consensus among local pub-
lic health participants in most exercises was that CDC staff
would be on the ground to help them fairly quickly, par-
ticularly in situations where bioterrorism was considered
likely.
Medical surge capacity
Most local health departments articulated some type of
plan for increasing medical surge capacity by developing
alternative care sites. In most instances however, these
plans were unable to hold up to even a modest amount of
scrutiny during the exercise because they were superficial
and lacked sufficient detail necessary for rapid implemen-
tation. Related to this issue, local health departments fre-
quently reported that there were not enough local health
care workers to manage these sites even if they could cre-
ate them. For example one participant noted, "We have
pop-up tents and beds to increase capacity, we just don't
have pop-up people to staff them."
Even obtaining a census of available staff members turned
out to be challenging as many health care participants
noted that some staff would likely be double-counted,
particularly nurses and security officers who might work
in several institutions. Increasing staff capacity through
the use of community volunteers, including retired medi-
cal personnel, while often recognized as one potential
solution to staffing shortages, proved to be extremely dif-
ficult to actually implement. Public health participants
universally recognized the importance of volunteers, but
learned that their plans to recruit, train, and mobilize
large numbers of volunteers were too vague and lackedBMC Public Health 2007, 7:92 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/92
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concrete actionable steps for realistic application during a
real emergency.
Strengths and improvements over time
In nearly all exercises, we also identified a number of
strengths within participating health departments. How-
ever, there was far less commonality in these strengths
than we observed with the areas for improvement. Univer-
sally, we observed public health leaders and staff who
were committed and struggling to 'do the right thing.' The
most commonly observed strengths were strong relation-
ships between epidemiologists and hospital infection
control practitioners and between public health workers
and other emergency coordinators. In some instances,
prior experience with emergency planning or response,
such as involvement of health departments and emer-
gency service agencies in coastal areas in preparing for or
responding to hurricanes, was associated with stronger
and more facile interactions between health department
officials and partner agencies.
Our exercises were conducted over a period of several
years. While we did not conduct exercises with any health
department more than once and did not employ an exper-
imental design to assess changes over time, we were struck
by how the performance of health departments overall
improved over time. First, compared to earlier exercises,
local health departments appeared far more sophisticated
about their early internal processes related to notification,
enhanced surveillance and large outbreak investigations.
In addition, by the end of the exercise period, health
departments had considered plans for surge capacity, and
participating hospitals had explicit plans for cancelling
emergency surgery and discharging less severely ill
patients. They also appeared more acutely aware of the
challenges in assuring adequate numbers of staff to pro-
vide care.
Lessons learned about tabletop exercise design
The large number of tabletop exercises we conducted
allowed us to test and compare different strategies for
designing and conducting tabletop exercises. These com-
parisons enabled us to modify our exercises over time to
build upon lessons learned from previous exercises.
Below we briefly highlight five lessons we learned from
this experience.
Exercises should be designed to achieve a specific objective
When first developing the tabletop exercises, our assump-
tion was that a single exercise could achieve multiple
objectives, such as training, relationship building, and
evaluation. While these objectives are interrelated and
opportunities often exist to achieve them concomitantly
in the same exercise, it is critical to define the priority
objective for the exercise because different objectives have
different implications for exercise design. For example, if
exercise participants outlined a response that was flawed
or problematic, in an exercise primarily focused around
the objective of training it would be appropriate for the
facilitator to pause and help the participants re-think their
approach. On the other hand, if the objective of the exer-
cise is evaluation, this type of facilitator involvement can
lead the participants to choose a different course of action
and therefore bias the overall outcome being evaluated.
Taken further, in an exercise designed to build relation-
ships and links across disciplines or agencies, a facilitator
intervention implying that a participant had made a mis-
take could be embarrassing or diminish that person's
credibility, depending on the level of trust among partici-
pants.
Exercises should be as realistic as possible while remaining logistically 
feasible
Taken together, the optimal mix of design elements repre-
sents a balance between exercise objectives and logistic
feasibility. The ideal balance is one that assures sufficient
realism to provide a meaningful experience while mini-
mizing distractions associated with the necessary artifice
of exercise scenarios. Some departures from reality may be
inadvertent if scenarios are developed with insufficient
attention to local routines, forcing participants to sidestep
usual procedures. Even seemingly minor design errors,
such as using an outdated name for a hospital, or a time
course for a disease that is inconsistent with its known epi-
demiology, can undermine the credibility of the exercise
and can distract participants enough to take them out of
their roles, thus disrupting the flow of the exercise.
Tabletop exercises should be designed around "issue areas" rather 
than scenarios
The desire for a realistic exercise scenario can lead to the
development of tabletop exercises around scenarios rather
than issue areas based on local preparedness needs and
priorities. This does not ensure that the participants will
address the important issue areas. A broad mix of chal-
lenges related to a given scenario must be addressed, often
simultaneously, ranging from conducting epidemiologic
or environmental investigations, implementing and mod-
ifying interventions as information becomes available,
communicating within and across agencies, and commu-
nicating with political leaders and the public. Introducing
this full set of tasks into an exercise scenario in a way that
meaningfully exercises relevant capacities is unlikely to
align with the exercise's objective. Moreover, different
stakeholders may want to address different issue areas and
may become frustrated if their expectations are not met. It
is therefore important for stakeholders to agree on a lim-
ited number of priority issue areas for the exercise and
then to focus the design of the scenario around these
areas.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:92 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/92
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For example, one set of exercises we designed focused on
pandemic influenza preparedness in local health depart-
ments. Because it was infeasible to exercise the entire pan-
demic plan around a single scenario and in a single
exercise, we developed the scenario and then the exercise
by first meeting with local stakeholders to decide on the
issue areas that would be covered in the exercise. These
issue areas included disease surveillance, medical surge
capacity, non-pharmacological disease control, and the
use of antiviral medications. The scenario was then cus-
tomized to unfold to deal with each of these issue areas.
Key decisions for each discussion point were then devel-
oped, as well as facilitator probes and instructions based
on the specific objective of the exercise.
Decision making must be forced, targeted, and time delineated
If not designed or facilitated properly, an exercise can lack
focus and resolution, leaving participants to wonder what
exactly was accomplished during the exercise. Therefore, it
is paramount that exercises are designed to focus on issue
areas that require concrete decisions over a limited period
of time. For example, an exercise dealing with a simulated
smallpox outbreak that unfolds over time might involve a
discussion period dealing with movement restrictions in
which participants are asked one or more questions such
as, "Should schools be closed at this point?" Participants
should then be given a limited amount of time to discuss
this issue and make a decision. It is the facilitator's job to
keep the discussion focused on the issue area and the spe-
cific question(s) at hand and to ensure that at the end of
discussion, participants have collectively made the deci-
sion(s) they were tasked to make. Exercises can be
designed to have multiple such issue area discussions as
the scenario unfolds.
Exercises should involve a limited number of participants
Depending on the goals and objectives of an exercise, an
exercise can involve a narrow or wide range of potential
participants. While broader inclusion would likely be
more realistic, such inclusiveness needs to be weighed
against the logistics of effectively managing a larger
number of participants and the potential adverse effects of
inclusion. For example, participants may be less comfort-
able discussing ideas, taking risks, or making mistakes,
depending on who is in the room. Such constraints may
impede the exercise process and undermine achievement
of exercise objectives.
One solution to this problem would be to sequentially
stage the involvement of different participants or to phys-
ically separate different groups in a way that more closely
mimics actual situations. For example, some conversa-
tions that involve airing uncertainties or weighing difficult
alternatives may normally involve a limited group of peo-
ple, and members of that group may be more comfortable
exercising such a conversation apart from colleagues from
other agencies or organizations.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it is substantially
more difficult logistically and it diminishes the opportu-
nity for people from different groups to gain an under-
standing of one another's role and approach to problems.
In those exercises where certain participants, notably law
enforcement, joined the scenarios at different stages, the
feedback was generally critical, and participants felt that
staging participation diminished learning and team-
building opportunities. Another solution is to split exer-
cise participants into two or more groups that allow eve-
ryone to participate, often placing people at similar levels
of responsibility in the same group, and to conclude the
exercise with a session that brings everyone together to
share what they learned.
Exercise design and execution may benefit from collaborative 
engagement of representatives from participating agencies and 
external developers and facilitators
The exercises described in this report represented collabo-
rations between people familiar with local circumstances
and people from outside the participating jurisdictions
who had expertise in exercise design and facilitation.
Because we did not test an alternative approach that exclu-
sively involved local personnel, it is difficult to generalize
from this experience about the value of engaging people
from outside the participating agencies. Nonetheless, it
was our impression that at certain points in the develop-
ment, facilitation, and feedback steps, there was value in
involving people who were not personally invested in
local relationships or situations and who could offer
seemingly independent advice or perspectives.
Discussion
Tabletop exercises can provide useful insights into both
strengths and vulnerabilities in public health prepared-
ness. It is important to recognize, however, that exercise
outcomes are influenced by the way they are designed and
conducted. The exercises described in this report empha-
sized varying dimensions of public health preparedness,
reflecting differences in state or local priorities for priori-
tizing exercise objectives. For example, some emphasized
the early response to initial reports of suspect illness while
others emphasized management of surges in demand for
health care services that are likely to occur later emergency
scenarios. Given the intellectual and emotional demands
of participation in an exercise, participants (and facilita-
tors) may be less energetic during later rather than earlier
stages of an exercise scenario, affecting perceived capacity
to execute different elements of a response. Potential gaps
between observed and actual preparedness should be con-
sidered in interpreting after-action reports and evaluating
exercises themselves.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:92 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/92
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The utility of tabletop exercises as tools to identify areas
for improvement and make improvements on these prob-
lems is still evolving. Our ability to evaluate exercise per-
formance is hampered by the lack of an evidence base
about what constitutes optimal performance and by the
lack of standards for assessing public health preparedness.
There is a need to move beyond qualitative performance
measures to ones that are quantifiable and can be meas-
ured over time. These quantifiable measures can range
from simple checklists to Likert rating scales to scorecards.
For example, in a series of our exercises we used checklists
to assess the performance of health departments related to
surveillance, risk communication and other functions.
One fairly consistent observation was that health depart-
ments identified gaps that had been identified in prior
exercises or actual experience, but had not yet been
addressed. Reasons for this included lack of time, and lack
of knowledge about how to make change. We now con-
clude exercises by having health departments prioritize
the challenges observed during the exercise and then have
them develop initial action plans related to up to three
priority items.
There are important limitations to our work and its inter-
pretation that must be recognized. First, the nature of our
exercises changed over time on a number of important
dimensions, including the scenario, priority objectives,
facilitation, exercise designers and facilitators, and atten-
tion to beginning an action plan after the hot wash. As a
result of this variation, we are unable to provide a numer-
ical tabulation of the numbers of health departments that
struggled with each gap or displayed given strengths. Sec-
ond, because we did not employ a methodology that
could conclusively assess change over time, we cannot be
certain that the improvements we identified were truly
reflective of improvement, and not due to the inclusion of
more sophisticated health departments in the latter part
of our exercise period. We doubt this is the case, however,
given the national emphasis on preparedness and plan-
ning and the ways in which health departments participat-
ing in later years qualitatively described their
improvement. Furthermore, similar observations regard-
ing improvements in public health preparedness during
the same time period have recently been reported by oth-
ers [24,25]. We also cannot asses the potential influences
that external events (e.g., hurricanes, outbreaks) may have
had on health departments during the time period of our
work, but it is noteworthy that all exercises were con-
cluded before Hurricane Katrina struck. In addition, our
exercises were not conducted in a random sample of
health departments, and the findings may not be general-
izable to all health departments. Finally, as discussed
above, the evidence base for determining best practices in
the design and conduct of exercises is extremely thin. We
share our experience in the hope that it will help others,
but do not propose that our recommendations constitute
best, proven practices.
Conclusion
Developing, conducting, and evaluating tabletop exercises
requires considerable planning and the perspectives of a
variety of stakeholders. While these tabletop exercises
identified both strengths and vulnerabilities in emergency
preparedness, additional work is needed to develop relia-
ble metrics to gauge exercise performance, inform follow-
up action steps, and to develop re-evaluation exercise
designs that assess the impact of post-exercise interven-
tions.
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